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Pesquisa : L01.906.394.622 [Categoria DeCS]
Referências encontradas : 449 [refinar]
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[PMID]:28487218
[Au] Autor:Busemeyer JR; Fakhari P; Kvam P
[Ad] Endereço:Indiana University, United States. Electronic address: jbusemey@indiana.edu.
[Ti] Título:Neural implementation of operations used in quantum cognition.
[So] Source:Prog Biophys Mol Biol;130(Pt A):53-60, 2017 Nov.
[Is] ISSN:1873-1732
[Cp] País de publicação:England
[La] Idioma:eng
[Ab] Resumo:Quantum probability theory has been successfully applied outside of physics to account for numerous findings from psychology regarding human judgement and decision making behavior. However, the researchers who have made these applications do not rely on the hypothesis that the brain is some type of quantum computer. This raises the question of how could the brain implement quantum algorithms other than quantum physical operations. This article outlines one way that a neural based system could perform the computations required by applications of quantum probability to human behavior.
[Mh] Termos MeSH primário: Sistema Nervoso
Teoria da Probabilidade
Teoria Quântica
[Mh] Termos MeSH secundário: Seres Humanos
Rede Nervosa/citologia
Rede Nervosa/fisiologia
Sistema Nervoso/citologia
[Pt] Tipo de publicação:JOURNAL ARTICLE; REVIEW
[Em] Mês de entrada:1711
[Cu] Atualização por classe:171113
[Lr] Data última revisão:
171113
[Sb] Subgrupo de revista:IM
[Da] Data de entrada para processamento:170511
[St] Status:MEDLINE


  2 / 449 MEDLINE  
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[PMID]:28442656
[Au] Autor:Hashimoto T
[Ad] Endereço:Department of Medical Radiological Technology, Faculty of Health Sciences, Kyorin University.
[Ti] Título:Series: Basic Exercises Using Excel (1).
[So] Source:Igaku Butsuri;36(3):173-178, 2016.
[Is] ISSN:1345-5354
[Cp] País de publicação:Japan
[La] Idioma:jpn
[Mh] Termos MeSH primário: Computação Matemática
Software
[Mh] Termos MeSH secundário: Entropia
Processamento de Imagem Assistida por Computador/métodos
Teoria da Probabilidade
[Pt] Tipo de publicação:JOURNAL ARTICLE; REVIEW
[Em] Mês de entrada:1706
[Cu] Atualização por classe:171013
[Lr] Data última revisão:
171013
[Sb] Subgrupo de revista:IM
[Da] Data de entrada para processamento:170427
[St] Status:MEDLINE
[do] DOI:10.11323/jjmp.36.3_173


  3 / 449 MEDLINE  
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[PMID]:27570097
[Au] Autor:Costello F; Watts P
[Ad] Endereço:School of Computer Science and Informatics, University College Dublin, Belfield, Dublin 4, Ireland. Electronic address: fintan.costello@ucd.ie.
[Ti] Título:People's conditional probability judgments follow probability theory (plus noise).
[So] Source:Cogn Psychol;89:106-33, 2016 Sep.
[Is] ISSN:1095-5623
[Cp] País de publicação:Netherlands
[La] Idioma:eng
[Ab] Resumo:A common view in current psychology is that people estimate probabilities using various 'heuristics' or rules of thumb that do not follow the normative rules of probability theory. We present a model where people estimate conditional probabilities such as P(A|B) (the probability of A given that B has occurred) by a process that follows standard frequentist probability theory but is subject to random noise. This model accounts for various results from previous studies of conditional probability judgment. This model predicts that people's conditional probability judgments will agree with a series of fundamental identities in probability theory whose form cancels the effect of noise, while deviating from probability theory in other expressions whose form does not allow such cancellation. Two experiments strongly confirm these predictions, with people's estimates on average agreeing with probability theory for the noise-cancelling identities, but deviating from probability theory (in just the way predicted by the model) for other identities. This new model subsumes an earlier model of unconditional or 'direct' probability judgment which explains a number of systematic biases seen in direct probability judgment (Costello & Watts, 2014). This model may thus provide a fully general account of the mechanisms by which people estimate probabilities.
[Mh] Termos MeSH primário: Heurística
Julgamento
Modelos Psicológicos
Teoria da Probabilidade
[Mh] Termos MeSH secundário: Teorema de Bayes
Seres Humanos
[Pt] Tipo de publicação:JOURNAL ARTICLE
[Em] Mês de entrada:1708
[Cu] Atualização por classe:170817
[Lr] Data última revisão:
170817
[Sb] Subgrupo de revista:IM
[Da] Data de entrada para processamento:160830
[St] Status:MEDLINE


  4 / 449 MEDLINE  
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[PMID]:27470193
[Au] Autor:Feldman J
[Ad] Endereço:Department of Psychology, Center for Cognitive Science, Rutgers University, New Brunswick, NJ, USA.
[Ti] Título:The simplicity principle in perception and cognition.
[So] Source:Wiley Interdiscip Rev Cogn Sci;7(5):330-40, 2016 Sep.
[Is] ISSN:1939-5086
[Cp] País de publicação:United States
[La] Idioma:eng
[Ab] Resumo:The simplicity principle, traditionally referred to as Occam's razor, is the idea that simpler explanations of observations should be preferred to more complex ones. In recent decades the principle has been clarified via the incorporation of modern notions of computation and probability, allowing a more precise understanding of how exactly complexity minimization facilitates inference. The simplicity principle has found many applications in modern cognitive science, in contexts as diverse as perception, categorization, reasoning, and neuroscience. In all these areas, the common idea is that the mind seeks the simplest available interpretation of observations- or, more precisely, that it balances a bias toward simplicity with a somewhat opposed constraint to choose models consistent with perceptual or cognitive observations. This brief tutorial surveys some of the uses of the simplicity principle across cognitive science, emphasizing how complexity minimization in a number of forms has been incorporated into probabilistic models of inference. WIREs Cogn Sci 2016, 7:330-340. doi: 10.1002/wcs.1406 For further resources related to this article, please visit the WIREs website.
[Mh] Termos MeSH primário: Cognição
Ciência Cognitiva
Percepção
Pensamento
[Mh] Termos MeSH secundário: Teorema de Bayes
Formação de Conceito
Seres Humanos
Teoria da Informação
Memória
Teoria da Probabilidade
Resolução de Problemas
[Pt] Tipo de publicação:JOURNAL ARTICLE; REVIEW
[Em] Mês de entrada:1703
[Cu] Atualização por classe:170902
[Lr] Data última revisão:
170902
[Sb] Subgrupo de revista:IM
[Da] Data de entrada para processamento:160730
[St] Status:MEDLINE
[do] DOI:10.1002/wcs.1406


  5 / 449 MEDLINE  
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[PMID]:27140527
[Au] Autor:Arya R; Sivaganesan S; Holland KD; Greiner HM; Mangano FT; Horn PS
[Ad] Endereço:Comprehensive Epilepsy Center, Division of Neurology, Cincinnati Children's Hospital Medical Center, Cincinnati, OH 45229, United States. Electronic address: Ravindra.Arya@cchmc.org.
[Ti] Título:A probabilistic approach for lateralization of seizure onset zone in drug-resistant epilepsy with bilateral cerebral pathology.
[So] Source:Math Biosci;277:136-40, 2016 07.
[Is] ISSN:1879-3134
[Cp] País de publicação:United States
[La] Idioma:eng
[Ab] Resumo:BACKGROUND: Lateralization of seizure-onset zone (SOZ) during electroencephalography (EEG) monitoring in people with bilateral potentially epileptogenic lesions is important to facilitate clinical decision making for resective surgery. METHODS: We develop two Bayesian approaches for estimating the number of consecutive ipsilateral seizures required to lateralize the SOZ to a given lower limit of 95% credible interval (LLI, assuming continuous prior distribution), or to a given posterior probability (assuming mixture of discrete and continuous prior probabilities). RESULTS: With estimation approach, if both the cerebral hemispheres are a priori equi-probable to contain SOZ, then using Jeffrey's prior, a minimum of 9, 18, and 38 consecutive ipsilateral seizures will yield an LLI of 0.81, 0.90, and 0.95 respectively. If one of the hemisphere is a priori more likely to have SOZ, then prior beta distributions with α=3, ß=2, and α=4, ß=3 will require a minimum of 18 and 24 consecutive ipsilateral seizures to yield an LLI of 0.80. Contrariwise, the testing approach allows approximation of the number of consecutive ipsilateral seizures to lateralize the SOZ depending on an estimate of prior probability of lateralized SOZ, to a desired posterior probability. For a prior probability of 0.5, using uniform prior, mixture model will require 7, 17, and 37 consecutive ipsilateral seizures to lateralize the SOZ with a posterior probability of 0.8, 0.9, and 0.95 respectively. CONCLUSION: While the reasoning presented here is based on probability theory, it is hoped that it may help clinical decision making and stimulate further validation with actual clinical data.
[Mh] Termos MeSH primário: Teorema de Bayes
Epilepsia Resistente a Medicamentos/diagnóstico
Eletroencefalografia/métodos
Teoria da Probabilidade
[Mh] Termos MeSH secundário: Seres Humanos
[Pt] Tipo de publicação:JOURNAL ARTICLE
[Em] Mês de entrada:1709
[Cu] Atualização por classe:171122
[Lr] Data última revisão:
171122
[Sb] Subgrupo de revista:IM
[Da] Data de entrada para processamento:160504
[St] Status:MEDLINE


  6 / 449 MEDLINE  
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[PMID]:27082756
[Au] Autor:Buckleton J; Curran J; Goudet J; Taylor D; Thiery A; Weir BS
[Ad] Endereço:Environmental and Scientific Research Ltd., Auckland, New Zealand; National Institute of Standards and Technology, Gaithersburg, MD, USA.
[Ti] Título:Population-specific FST values for forensic STR markers: A worldwide survey.
[So] Source:Forensic Sci Int Genet;23:91-100, 2016 07.
[Is] ISSN:1878-0326
[Cp] País de publicação:Netherlands
[La] Idioma:eng
[Ab] Resumo:The interpretation of matching between DNA profiles of a person of interest and an item of evidence is undertaken using population genetic models to predict the probability of matching by chance. Calculation of matching probabilities is straightforward if allelic probabilities are known, or can be estimated, in the relevant population. It is more often the case, however, that the relevant population has not been sampled and allele frequencies are available only from a broader collection of populations as might be represented in a national or regional database. Variation of allele probabilities among the relevant populations is quantified by the population structure quantity FST and this quantity affects matching proportions. Matching within a population can be interpreted only with respect to matching between populations and we show here that FST, can be estimated from sample allelic matching proportions within and between populations. We report such estimates from data we extracted from 250 papers in the forensic literature, representing STR profiles at up to 24 loci from nearly 500,000 people in 446 different populations. The results suggest that theta values in current forensic use do not have the buffer of conservatism often thought.
[Mh] Termos MeSH primário: Grupos de Populações Continentais/genética
Impressões Digitais de DNA
Frequência do Gene
Marcadores Genéticos
Genética Populacional
Repetições de Microssatélites
[Mh] Termos MeSH secundário: Seres Humanos
Análise de Componente Principal
Teoria da Probabilidade
[Pt] Tipo de publicação:JOURNAL ARTICLE; RESEARCH SUPPORT, NON-U.S. GOV'T; RESEARCH SUPPORT, N.I.H., EXTRAMURAL; RESEARCH SUPPORT, U.S. GOV'T, NON-P.H.S.
[Nm] Nome de substância:
0 (Genetic Markers)
[Em] Mês de entrada:1706
[Cu] Atualização por classe:171112
[Lr] Data última revisão:
171112
[Sb] Subgrupo de revista:IM
[Da] Data de entrada para processamento:160416
[St] Status:MEDLINE


  7 / 449 MEDLINE  
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[PMID]:27053743
[Au] Autor:Yearsley JM; Pothos EM
[Ad] Endereço:Department of Psychology, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA james.m.yearsley@vanderbilt.edu.
[Ti] Título:Zeno's paradox in decision-making.
[So] Source:Proc Biol Sci;283(1828), 2016 04 13.
[Is] ISSN:1471-2954
[Cp] País de publicação:England
[La] Idioma:eng
[Ab] Resumo:Classical probability theory has been influential in modelling decision processes, despite empirical findings that have been persistently paradoxical from classical perspectives. For such findings, some researchers have been successfully pursuing decision models based on quantum theory (QT). One unique feature of QT is the collapse postulate, which entails that measurements (or in decision-making, judgements) reset the state to be consistent with the measured outcome. If there is quantum structure in cognition, then there has to be evidence for the collapse postulate. A striking, a prioriprediction, is that opinion change will be slowed down (under idealized conditions frozen) by continuous judgements. In physics, this is the quantum Zeno effect. We demonstrate a quantum Zeno effect in decision-making in humans and so provide evidence that advocates the use of quantum principles in decision theory, at least in some cases.
[Mh] Termos MeSH primário: Tomada de Decisões
Teoria da Decisão
[Mh] Termos MeSH secundário: Seres Humanos
Modelos Psicológicos
Teoria da Probabilidade
Teoria Quântica
[Pt] Tipo de publicação:JOURNAL ARTICLE; RESEARCH SUPPORT, NON-U.S. GOV'T; RESEARCH SUPPORT, U.S. GOV'T, NON-P.H.S.
[Em] Mês de entrada:1612
[Cu] Atualização por classe:170503
[Lr] Data última revisão:
170503
[Sb] Subgrupo de revista:IM
[Da] Data de entrada para processamento:160408
[St] Status:MEDLINE


  8 / 449 MEDLINE  
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[PMID]:26829762
[Au] Autor:Van der Borght L; Houtman F; Burle B; Notebaert W
[Ad] Endereço:Department of Experimental Psychology, Ghent University, Belgium.
[Ti] Título:Distinguishing the influence of task difficulty on error-related ERPs using surface Laplacian transformation.
[So] Source:Biol Psychol;115:78-85, 2016 Mar.
[Is] ISSN:1873-6246
[Cp] País de publicação:Netherlands
[La] Idioma:eng
[Ab] Resumo:Electrophysiologically, errors are characterized by a negative deflection, the error related negativity (ERN), which is followed by the error positivity (Pe). However, it has been suggested that this latter component consists of two subcomponents, with an early frontocentral Pe reflecting a continuation of the ERN, and a centro-parietal Pe reflecting error awareness. Using Laplacian transformed averages, a correct-related negativity (CRN; similar to the ERN), can be found on correct trials. As this technique allows for the decomposition of the recorded scalp potentials resulting in a better dissociation of the underlying brain activities, Laplacian transformation was used in the present study to differentiate between both the ERN/CRN and both Pe components. Additionally, task difficulty was manipulated. Our results show a clearly distinguishable early and late Pe. Both the ERN/CRN and the early Pe varied with task difficulty, showing decreased ERN/early Pe in the difficult condition. However, the late Pe was not influenced by our difficulty manipulation. This suggests that the early and the late Pe reflect qualitatively different processes.
[Mh] Termos MeSH primário: Atenção/fisiologia
Discriminação (Psicologia)/fisiologia
Eletroencefalografia/métodos
Potenciais Evocados/fisiologia
Orientação/fisiologia
Reconhecimento Visual de Modelos/fisiologia
Teoria da Probabilidade
Tempo de Reação/fisiologia
[Mh] Termos MeSH secundário: Adulto
Conscientização/fisiologia
Córtex Cerebral/fisiologia
Feminino
Seres Humanos
Masculino
Adulto Jovem
[Pt] Tipo de publicação:JOURNAL ARTICLE; RESEARCH SUPPORT, NON-U.S. GOV'T
[Em] Mês de entrada:1610
[Cu] Atualização por classe:161230
[Lr] Data última revisão:
161230
[Sb] Subgrupo de revista:IM
[Da] Data de entrada para processamento:160202
[St] Status:MEDLINE


  9 / 449 MEDLINE  
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[PMID]:26826642
[Au] Autor:Park JS; Kang UG
[Ad] Endereço:Department of Psychiatry, Seoul National University Hospital, 101 Daehak-ro, Jongno-gu, Seoul 110-744, Republic of Korea; Department of Psychiatry, Maeumsarang Hospital, Wanju, Jeollabuk-do, Republic of Korea.
[Ti] Título:How delusion is formed?
[So] Source:Med Hypotheses;87:61-5, 2016 Feb.
[Is] ISSN:1532-2777
[Cp] País de publicação:United States
[La] Idioma:eng
[Ab] Resumo:Traditionally, delusions have been considered to be the products of misinterpretation and irrationality. However, some theorists have argued that delusions are normal or rational cognitive responses to abnormal experiences. That is, when a recently experienced peculiar event is more plausibly explained by an extraordinary hypothesis, confidence in the veracity of this extraordinary explanation is reinforced. As the number of such experiences, driven by the primary disease process in the perceptual domain, increases, this confidence builds and solidifies, forming a delusion. We tried to understand the formation of delusions using a simulation based on Bayesian inference. We found that (1) even if a delusional explanation is only marginally more plausible than a non-delusional one, the repetition of the same experience results in a firm belief in the delusion. (2) The same process explains the systematization of delusions. (3) If the perceived plausibility of the explanation is not consistent but varies over time, the development of a delusion is delayed. Additionally, this model may explain why delusions are not corrected by persuasion or rational explanation. This Bayesian inference perspective can be considered a way to understand delusions in terms of rational human heuristics. However, such experiences of "rationality" can lead to irrational conclusions, depending on the characteristics of the subject.
[Mh] Termos MeSH primário: Delusões/etiologia
Modelos Psicológicos
[Mh] Termos MeSH secundário: Teorema de Bayes
Cognição
Delusões/psicologia
Seres Humanos
Funções Verossimilhança
Percepção
Teoria da Probabilidade
Transtornos Psicóticos/psicologia
[Pt] Tipo de publicação:JOURNAL ARTICLE
[Em] Mês de entrada:1610
[Cu] Atualização por classe:161230
[Lr] Data última revisão:
161230
[Sb] Subgrupo de revista:IM
[Da] Data de entrada para processamento:160131
[St] Status:MEDLINE


  10 / 449 MEDLINE  
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[PMID]:26709415
[Au] Autor:Costello F; Watts P
[Ad] Endereço:School of Computer Science and Informatics, University College Dublin.
[Ti] Título:Probability theory plus noise: Replies to Crupi and Tentori (2016) and to Nilsson, Juslin, and Winman (2016).
[So] Source:Psychol Rev;123(1):112-23, 2016 Jan.
[Is] ISSN:1939-1471
[Cp] País de publicação:United States
[La] Idioma:eng
[Ab] Resumo:A standard assumption in much of current psychology is that people do not reason about probability using the rules of probability theory but instead use various heuristics or "rules of thumb," which can produce systematic reasoning biases. In Costello and Watts (2014), we showed that a number of these biases can be explained by a model where people reason according to probability theory but are subject to random noise. More importantly, that model also predicted agreement with probability theory for certain expressions that cancel the effects of random noise: Experimental results strongly confirmed this prediction, showing that probabilistic reasoning is simultaneously systematically biased and "surprisingly rational." In their commentaries on that paper, both Crupi and Tentori (2016) and Nilsson, Juslin, and Winman (2016) point to various experimental results that, they suggest, our model cannot explain. In this reply, we show that our probability theory plus noise model can in fact explain every one of the results identified by these authors. This gives a degree of additional support to the view that people's probability judgments embody the rational rules of probability theory and that biases in those judgments can be explained as simply effects of random noise.
[Mh] Termos MeSH primário: Julgamento/fisiologia
Modelos Teóricos
Teoria da Probabilidade
[Mh] Termos MeSH secundário: Seres Humanos
[Pt] Tipo de publicação:COMMENT; JOURNAL ARTICLE
[Em] Mês de entrada:1604
[Cu] Atualização por classe:151229
[Lr] Data última revisão:
151229
[Sb] Subgrupo de revista:IM
[Da] Data de entrada para processamento:151229
[St] Status:MEDLINE
[do] DOI:10.1037/rev0000018



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